Does your Cyber review include supplier bank-detail fraud?

The request can look routine

CGD describes invoice fraud where someone impersonating a supplier requests payment to changed bank details. It recommends checking through contact details independent of the message. The practical lesson is that a request should not authenticate its own contact route. A familiar email display name or recognisable-looking invoice alone does not confirm authenticity.

Sources: Caixa Geral de Depósitos — Invoice fraud, independent verification and response to suspected fraud; full page reread 2 November 2026 ↗

A fictional review

Fictional example: Sofia’s small business receives a supplier-detail change late in the day. The team pauses the change, finds the contact already held in its validated records and checks through that route. It does not call the number in the suspicious message. Clara Mota helps Sofia retain the process followed and the response obtained. The story describes no real attack and does not suggest that one control prevents every type of fraud.

Describe the process when reviewing insurance

Prepare a short map of who receives a change, who verifies it, who can update supplier records and who authorises payment. Ask specifically how the quotation treats a transfer induced by deception, including applicable limits, exclusions and duties. Do not assume that a Cyber label includes financial losses from every fraud. Keep the answer with the version of the documents reviewed.

Prevention, incidents and enquiries use different routes

If fraud is suspected, CGD advises immediate contact with the bank and authorities. Do not wait for a new quotation before acting; preserve information through the appropriate process. To review business exposure, select Cyber on rmachado.group and say that invoice fraud needs clarification. Never post credentials, access codes, real bank details or banking documents in public comments.